This paper examines how the adoption of the Australian ballot (AB), and ipso facto, the transition from the nominal to effective secret vote, shaped the nature of party politics in Brazil.
The ballot is the fundamental instrument of democracy in the modern world. Perhaps more than any other device utilized in contemporary elections, it has come to embody the process by which voter preferences structure the makeup of the ruling elite. Yet many citizens of democratic polities take for granted the series of institutional innovations in the dissemination and composition of the ballot that made it possible for this instrument to serve today as a symbol of the free and authentic convictions of voters. Among such innovations, it was a specific packet of reforms in ballot preparation and distribution, the so-called Australian ballot (AB ) reforms, which were responsible for one of the most crucial turning points in the history of democracy-the transition from de jure to de facto secrecy in vote choice.
What did the adoption of the AB entail? In many countries, the adoption of the AB was preceded by a system in which nominally secret voting was enacted through privacy guarantees provided at the moment of suffrage, usually in the form of closed voting booths and a requirement that ballots not have markings that could identify individual voters. In such contexts, parties and/or candidates printed ballot papers themselves and distributed them, via campaign workers, to potential voters. The ballot papers utilized in such circumstances were specific to the candidate or party, and represented a vote only for that individual or organization. This state of affairs allowed candidates or campaign workers to condition any benefits (or punishments) targeted to individual voters on their receipt of the candidate or party printed ballot. Moreover, in such settings political actors often organized the transportation of voters to the polls and allocated the candidate or party printed ballots to voters immediately before the latter entered the polling station, thereby reinforcing the actors' capacity to infer whether or not voters had voted their way. In an AB system, by contrast, all ballots-printed by the state at public expense-have an identical format, permit the selection of any registered candidate, and are typically allocated to voters inside the polling station by electoral authorities. As such, the capacity to monitor individual vote choice is much reduced by the adoption of the AB. At the same time, the AB also imposes new educational requirements on voting, as the ability to read the printed word may suddenly become a prerequisite for casting a valid ballot. This paper provides an empirical examination of how the adoption of the AB, and ipso facto, the transition from the nominal to effective secret vote, shapes the nature of political representation. It does so by drawing from the historical experience of Brazil before and after the introduction of the AB in this country in the early 1960s. Directly engaging the claims of both an emerging literature on institutions and clientelism in developing democracies as well as an established literature on the consequences of the AB in the United States, the paper assesses the impact of the Australian ballot on three outcomes: 1) the Left-Right ideological leanings of voters at the ballot box; 2) the degree of electoral control enjoyed by local vote brokers (coronéis as they are called in the historiography of Brazilian elections); and 3) the capacity of citizens to effectively participate in the electoral process.
The question of how vote secrecy affects the conduct of politics is a foundational concern in the social sciences, and one which is as old and enduring as democracy itself. It has long captivated some of the keenest minds in the Western world. The adoption of the secret vote in Ancient Rome was of deep concern for no less than Quintus and Marcus Cicero, who believed that it undermined the political dominance of the nobles and ultimately led to the decline of the Republic (Yakobson 1999, pp.126-133) . Nearly two millenia later, Montesquieu weighed in on the issue by arguing that voting ought only be conducted in public, as good governance required that the masses "be directed by those of higher rank, and restrained within bounds by the gravity of eminent personages" (Spirit Given the illustrious intellectual pedigree of the debate on vote secrecy, it is not surprising that much contemporary scholarship remains devoted to teasing out the impact of a fully secret ballot.
In fact, it is no exaggeration to state that empirically evaluating the impact of the secret ballot-as manifested by the introduction of the AB-on the structure of political representation is one of the great quests of institutionally oriented social science. It is a task which has courted the efforts of political scientists, economists, and historians, and one which has spawned numerous investigations into the historical experiences of polities around the world. Yet in spite of these efforts, it has proven quite challenging to arrive at a clear consensus about the precise manner in which vote secrecy reshapes the contours of democratic representation.
The central difficulty for researchers has been to put together a dataset which offers sufficient leverage to credibly evaluate causal claims about the impact of the secret ballot. We would submit that by drawing upon the Brazilian historical experience with the AB, this study was able to assemble and analyze just such a dataset. As will be described in detail below, the unusual staggered and geographically and institutionally targeted fashion in which the AB was introduced in Brazil provides the study with an unprecedented opportunity to measure with precision the causal impact of this important democratic innovation.
There are three crucial sources of variation which undergird our empirical analysis: 1) spatial (differential adoption of the AB across states); 2) temporal (differential adoption of the AB over time); 3) institutional (differential timing of the adoption of the AB for different types of elected offices). Taking maximal advantage of these three sources of variation, we utilize the powerful but rarely employed triple difference-in-differences estimation strategy. Average differences in electoral outcomes are assessed across different offices (federal deputy vs. senate) prior to and after the AB is introduced for one of these offices (federal deputy) in a particular state (São Paulo). Inference proceeds by comparing the average over time difference in outcomes across offices for municipalities located in the state where the AB is adopted for the office in question (São Paulo) to the average over time difference in outcomes across offices for municipalities located in states where the AB is not adopted for said office (the other states).
In adopting this approach, we build upon recent work in political science and political economics that makes use of traditional, spatio-temporally based difference-in-difference methods to study the effects of institutions and policies (cf. Ladd . By bring these strategies together in a single empirical framework, we believe our paper is the first in Political Science to provide a template for simultaneously exploiting variation over space, time, and the institutional targeting of rules in order to assess the causal impact of an important aspect of democratic institutional design.
To anticipate our findings, our paper shows that the adoption of the AB sharply increased the fraction of valid votes cast in favor of parties of the Left, confirming an important recent claim made in the literature (as well as the ancient fears of the brothers Cicero). However, we find that the reason it had this effect lies primarily with the remarkable obstacle to voting it created for voters suffering from functional illiteracy. In particular, we find that the AB engendered a massive increase in wasted votes, i.e. the casting of blank or null ballots. Moreover, we show that this impact was most pronounced in areas where levels of literacy were low. As is often the case in agrarian settings, voters in such areas were likely to be under the influence of local notables and tended to vote for the parties of the Right. By making the act of voting unintelligible to such citizens, the AB made it impossible for them to vote as their local notable had dictated, even if they were otherwise inclined to do so. Ironically, the AB thus fashioned a more progressive politics in Brazil in the most regressive of ways: by disenfranchising the extremely poor and uneducated.
Theses about the Consequences of the Australian Ballot This upsurge of research on often relatively fine-grained nuances of ballot design in contemporary democracies has inspired social scientists to take a step back and revisit a question which has long intrigued historians of democratic practice: how did the transition from de jure secret voting-the use of the ballot box and closed voting booths-to de facto secret voting-the introduction of the AB-affect local power structures and electoral outcomes? Three main responses have been proffered to these questions.
Firstly, scholars have argued for many years that the AB undermines the effectiveness of using bribes and/or sanctions to manipulate the voting decisions of individual voters, and, as a consequence, erodes the power of political actors who rely on these tactics as a central means of bringing out the vote. The logic undergirding this claim rests on the enforceability of vote contracts with and without the AB. In the absence of the AB, voters generally cannot get away with accepting the ballot and bribe offered by a political operative then voting their conscience anyway, nor do they usually have the wherewithal to resist the demands of an employer or patron without paying a steep price. This is because the reliance of voters on candidate or party printed ballots makes shirking on a deal or the failure to comply with orders easily verifiable by the concerned political actor. Of course, in theory voters may be able to accept the ballot from one political operative then switch it later for another.
However, to do so the voter must solicit the ballot from a different operative; this is a semi-public act which may very well be observed by the operative the voter has betrayed. Moreover, to the degree that political operatives control transportation to the polls, the opportunities for such switching may be practically nonexistent.
In the mid-19th century United States and 1940s Minas Gerais, Brazil, for example, nearly identical institutions were developed to minimize ballot switching. Referred to as "cooping" in the former and the use of "electoral barracks" in the latter, campaign workers would funnel voters into a building or warehouse, provide them with drink and entertainment until the day of the election, then carefully guard the voters' approach to the polling place so that no competing ballots could ever reach their hands (Bensel 2004 , pp.179-184, Carvalho 1958 . In this environment of high vote monitorability, voting contracts are enforceable by political actors at a reasonable cost.
As a consequence, it is typically argued that without the AB, a market in votes-negotiated either directly between candidates and voters or indirectly between candidates and brokers who control a captive electorate-is likely to flourish.
By contrast, the AB makes it basically costless for a voter to accept a bribe or countenance a threat then subsequently vote as his heart desires. Voting contracts in this context are essentially unenforceable, which eliminates the possibility of an efficiently operating market in votes. Consequently, political actors who enjoy a comparative advantage in bribery and intimidation are likely to see their political clout decline as a result of the adoption of the AB. As famously put by the American reformer John Wigmore:
By compelling the dishonest man to vote in secrecy, [the AB] renders it impossible for him to prove his dishonesty, and thus deprives him of the market for it. By compelling the honest man to vote in secrecy it relieves him not merely from the grosser forms of intimidation but from more subtle and perhaps pernicious coercion of every sort" (1889, p.32).
Exactly who loses under the AB? One set of losers should be any local agents who market citizens' votes to outside parties or candidates. In a series of influential papers, historically oriented political The second argument about the consequences of the AB concerns its ramifications for the ideological balance of power in the party system. In this regard, the literature claims that the AB increases the electoral strength of parties of the Left relative to those of the Right. Two scenarios have been elaborated to explain why this should be so. In the first scenario, suppose that different groups of voters share a roughly equivalent intrinsic valuation of voting their conscience and that for all voters there is decreasing marginal utility of income. It then follows that the reservation price demanded by rich voters to vote contrary to their ideological preferences will be greater than that demanded by poor voters, implying that vote buyers will primarily target the poor and that ideological preferences of this segment of the electorate will be systematically underrepresented in One strand of this literature argues that in certain instances it may be appropriate to think of the AB as a form of suffrage restriction, i.e. a legal impediment to voting instituted so as to keep certain social groups from successfully participating in the electoral process (Kousser 1973; , Crowley 2006 ). The claim centers on how the move to the AB affects the voting process for illiterates. Under a party or candidate printed ballot system, the mechanics of voting require nothing more than to slip the ballot into the urn (or the official envelope and then the urn, as was the case in Brazil), a task requiring no special educational background. In order to participate effectively with the AB in place, however, the voter must typically have sufficient literacy skills to recognize the written name of his favored candidate and be able denote his preference appropriately. If illiteracy has a distinct partisan bias, meaning that it afflicts the supporters of some parties more than others, then the introduction of the AB may shift electoral fortunes in favor of the parties with the relatively more literate support bases.
This is apparently what occurred in a number of states in the late 19th century American South. Democratic party leaders realized that an AB system would effectively disenfranchise AfricanAmericans (whose literacy rates at that time were quite low), thereby giving them an electoral advantage vis-a-vis their Republican rivals (who depended upon African-Americans as a crucial part of their support coalition). Indeed, the epoch known as the so-called "one party South"-due to the electoral dominance of the Democratic party-followed soon after the introduction of the AB (as well as a host of other, more explicit, suffrage restrictions). A stanza from a racist Democratic campaign song in Arkansas from the era illustrates the perception among party members that the AB would disenfranchise African Americans, thereby benefiting the party:
The Australian Ballot works like a charm/It makes them think and scratch/And when a negro gets a ballot/He has certainly met his match (quoted in Kousser 1974, p.54) The prospect that the Australian Ballot would have disenfranchising effects on illiterates in Brazil, and important electoral consequences through this channel, is one which would certainly appear to be reasonable on its face. The 1960 demographic census, which took place around the time of the institutional changes studied here, reported that 40.3% of Brazilians above the age of 18 (the legal age of suffrage) did not know how to read and write (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 1967). Thus, a very large contingent of voters stood to be affected by ballot reform that necessitated familiarity with the written word. Now, according to the letter of the law, this actually should not have mattered all that much: illiterates had been legally barred from voting in Brazil since the Constitution of 1891, a right they only regained almost a century later with the Constitution of 1988.
As a matter of practice, however, illiterates regularly participated in Brazilian elections throughout the 20th century (Love 1970 ). This state of affairs was due largely to lax registration requirements: the proof of literacy required to register to vote entailed no more than signing one's name in the presence of an electoral judge. As a consequence, coronéis were known to coach functional illiterates on how to sign their names so that these individuals could later be brought before a judge and inscribed as registered voters (Blondel 1957, pp.74-77) . These voters would subsequently become part of a coronel 's clientele, voting the ballots that he or his underlings allocated to them.
Due to the strong concentration of functional illiteracy in the impoverished rural areas of Brazil, traditionally the strongholds of conservative local bosses, if it is true that the AB effectively disen-franchises illiterates, then it should also have had important consequences for the ideological balance of power in the party system. In particular, one would expect that were the AB to prohibit registered voters with low levels of functional literacy from participating in the electoral process, this would redound to the benefit of the parties of the Left, since these had supporters who were relatively well educated and located in cities (Soares 2001 ).
To summarize, the literature emphasizes three consequences of the AB, each of which we explicitly evaluate in this paper: 1) the AB shifts the ideological balance of power from Right to Left; 2) the AB weakens the power of local vote brokers; 3) the AB creates a considerable obstacle to effective political participation by illiterates.
Improvements Over Previous Studies of the AB
The empirical research strategy utilized in this paper improves upon existing analyses of the impact of the AB in several fundamental ways. Firstly, the study provides the first set of analyses of the AB in Latin America which are able to exploit both cross-sectional and temporal (not to mention institutional) variation in its adoption. Moreover, due to the highly standardized manner in which the AB was imposed on or withheld from states in Brazil, the paper is able to study the impact of the AB free from concerns about mismeasurement of the true nature of the institutional intervention being analyzed, a potentially serious problem in other settings. As a result of these advantages, we are able to provide more direct and credible estimates of the AB's causal impact than have been presented in existing work. 1960s, especially in rural areas, is that there was a major schism between the Catholic Church and the conservative parties that led to peasant outreach efforts by Catholic reform organizations at roughly the same time the AB went into effect (Scully 1992, pp. 130-132) . Even if the AB had no effect, these efforts might explain why one finds the changing relationship between the size of the agricultural workforce and Right party support encountered in the authors' data. A similar argument could be made for the relegalization of the Chilean Communist Party, which also occurred simultaneous to the implementation of the AB. Unfortunately, disentangling the impact of these factors from that of the AB is impossible given the temporally and spatially uniform way the AB was adopted in Chile.
A recent study examining the impact of the adoption of the AB in Colombia in 1991 faces the same types of inferential challenges (Santos 2007 ). This work assesses whether or not the AB destabilized clientelistic linkages between voters and Colombia's traditional parties by examining the pre-and post-reform relationship between votes for traditional parties and public employment in precincts located within the capital city of Bogotá. However, as recognized by the author, the changes which took place in this relationship could very well be attributed to other institutional reforms taking place at the same time, such as the professionalization of the bureaucracy, the reduction of pork barrel expenditures, and greater functional autonomy of the Mayor's Office. As a consequence, pinpointing the exact contribution of the AB is impossible.
With variation in the adoption of the AB across units, time, and even types of elections, such concerns do not apply to the current study. In addition to overcoming obstacles to the estimation of the impact of the AB in Latin America, the analyses conducted here also significantly improve upon investigations of the AB conducted in contexts where both temporal and cross-sectional variation in the adoption of the AB were present. The most widely researched country case fitting this description is the United States, which, like Brazil, adopted the AB in some states earlier than others, thereby permitting the exploitation of cross-sectional and temporal variation as we do here. 1 However, studies of the AB in the US are plagued by the difficulty that the internal organization of the official ballot differed drastically by state, as did the nature of the party printed ballots that preceded the official ballot. As a consequence, it is very difficult to speak of the impact of "the" AB in the US, since no such single entity existed. Put in the language of program evaluation, the myriad and subtle ways in which the AB was implemented across states in the US makes it highly probable that analyses based on the US case will suffer from biases due to "unrepresented versions of the treatment" (Rubin 1986 ).
Not so for Brazil. During the period covered by the study, Brazil's electoral legislation carefully specified the characteristics that both the official ballot and the candidate printed ballots had to satisfy. These were nationwide standards strictly enforced by the regional electoral tribunals that make up the country's centralized electoral justice system. Consequently, the presence or absence of the AB for a given office in one state meant the same thing as it would in any other state. By studying the AB in Brazil, one can rest assured that the study is estimating the effect of "the" AB, at least in the form in which it was adopted-uniformly-in that country.
Institutional Background
Brazil's experience in rolling out the AB was both unusual and fortuitous from the standpoint of the social scientist. The AB was first introduced for presidential and vice-presidential elections in August 1955 (law 2582). The following year, the AB was extended to all other elected offices attained by a plurality vote (law 2982, art. 9): governor and vice-governor, senators and their substitutes (suplentes), mayors and vice-mayors, and justices of the peace. Subsequently, in July 1962, law 4109 extended the AB to offices filled by proportional representation-federal deputy, state deputy, and municipal councilor-but only for select jurisdictions. According to the law, the AB only applied to those proportional contests taking place in the state of São Paulo, the state of Guanabara (comprised solely of the city of Rio de Janeiro), and state capitals. A new electoral code promulgated in July 1965 (law 4737) was ostensibly to be the final step in the process, extending the AB to all electoral contests in all jurisdictions in Brazil. However, the part of the code dealing with the AB did not actually take effect until 1970. 2 In order to get leverage on the impact of the AB, this study examines municipal-level vote returns for federal deputy and senate contests in the 1958-1962 period, the last set of legislative contests to take place before the onset of military rule in 1964 (subsequent articles will examine the 1966-1970 period). During this time, general legislative elections-which put seats for both the Chamber of Deputies and Senate simultaneously up for grabs-were held in 1958 and 1962. In 1958, the AB was in effect throughout all of Brazil for senatorial contests, whereas candidate printed ballots were utilized throughout all of Brazil for the deputy contests. In 1962, the AB remained in effect for all of Brazil for the senatorial contests but was also extended to deputy contests in the state of São Paulo, the city of Rio de Janeiro, and state capitals. Figure 1 provides a timeline of these events. In municipalities where the AB was in effect for both types of contests, voters received an official ballot from the presiding officer in the polling station divided into two columns: one allowing the voter to denote her preferences for the plurality contests (which included the senate) and another allowing the voter to denote her preferences for the proportional contests (which included federal deputy).
In municipalities where the AB was in effect for the plurality contests but not the proportional contests, voters received an official ballot from the presiding officer for the plurality contests only. In this case, the voter voted in two stages. First, she entered the closed voting cabin and marked her preferences on the official ballot for the plurality contests, subsequently folding it and dropping it into the urn. Next, she returned to the closed voting cabin, deposited the candidate printed ballot for the proportional contests into an official envelope provided by the presiding officer, and subsequently dropped the envelope into the urn.
For the plurality contests, the AB listed the names of each candidate running for each office (senator, governor, etc.), requiring the voter to denote her preference by making a mark next to the preferred candidate. For the proportional contests (federal deputy, state deputy, etc.), where the number of candidates running was typically very large, the AB provided the voter with two lines where she could write in the name or candidate number of her favored candidate for a given office.
The full lists of candidates for these offices was not included on the ballot itself, although said lists were required to be posted in a visible location within the polling place (TSE Resolution No. 7018, September 4, 1962 ).
In the locales where candidate printed ballots were utilized for proportional contests, there were a series of requirements these had to satisfy. They all had to be white, rectangular in shape (approximately 7 × 10 cm), and sufficiently flexible to be folded into the official envelopes furnished by the electoral authorities. The name of the candidate, his party or coalition, and the office being contested all had to be typed onto the ballot. No other signs, slogans, or illustrations were permitted on the ballot. These rules were uniform: the regulations governing the layout of official ballots and candidate printed ballots applied equally to all municipalities in the territory of Brazil.
Data and Measurement
The primary data upon which this study draws are municipal-level vote returns, broken down by candidate and party, for federal deputy and senate contests held in 1958 and 1962. These returns are contained in municipal acts (atas municipais) which are housed in the archives of regional electoral tribunals located in the capital of each Brazilian state. A team of research assistants, composed of Brazilian nationals, was paid to visit these electoral tribunals and provide a digitized copy of the returns. Upon receipt of the digitized returns, these were then coded into electoral format by a team of graduate and undergraduate research assistants at the author's home institution. In total, municipal-level returns from this time period which included both federal deputy and senate In 1962, all the interior municipalities of São Paulo adopt the AB for the federal deputy contest, whereas as none of the interior municipalities of the control states do so, permitting us to assess the impact of the AB from observed over time changes in outcomes across types of electoral contests in São Paulo and the control states.
Outcomes. The dependent variables utilized in the analysis correspond to the three hypothesized consequences of the AB discussed above. In order to tap into the ideological balance of power in the party system, we examine two outcome variables: the percentage of the valid vote cast for candidates belonging to Left parties and the ideological center of gravity, defined as the percentage of the valid vote cast for candidates belonging to Right parties minus the percentage of the valid vote cast for candidates belonging to Left parties. These variables were recorded for each municipality in a given state for both the federal deputy and senate contests. For federal deputy contests, the electoral returns of this period report the number of votes cast at the municipal-level for entire parties (if a party ran an independent list of candiates), coalitions (if two or more parties in a state ran a joint list of candidates), as well as for individual candidates.
In instances where coalitions were formed that contained parties of different ideological leanings, we faced the challenge of calculating the electoral support of each party within a given coalition (which was necessary in order to calculate total Left or Right support). We did this by following the strategy In this way, we were able to encounter the party affiliations of essentially all serious candidates (candidates whose personal vote total consisted of 2% or more of their coalition total in a given state). In the case of senate candidates, which were relatively few, partisan affiliations were easily verifiable based upon official electoral returns and/or the sources mentioned above.
In order to measure the power of Brazil's local vote brokers, the coronéis, we use as our dependent variable the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of vote concentration for contests for federal deputy. For a municipality  in a given election, the vote concentration index is equal to:
where   is the vote share of candidate  in municipality  and  is the total number of candi- In order to describe the causal relationship between the AB and a given outcome, we follow standard practice and employ the Rubin-Holland-Neymann potential outcomes framework (cf. Rubin 1974). According to this framework, each post-treatment element in the outcome vector is characterized by the potential outcome function, (   POST ()   POST ()) 0 , which describes the outcome which would have obtained in the two types of legislative contests were   = , i.e. were the ballot type utilized in the federal deputy contest in 1962 equal to . The causal estimand of interest is the average treatment effect for the treatment (ATT), the average effect of the AB for the outcome in the federal deputy contest for those municipalities that utilized it for said office,
Identification. Two key identifying assumptions make it possible to estimate this quantity from the data. The first is that, on average, the ballot technology adopted for the federal deputy contest did not affect the outcome in the senate contest for the municipalities that employed the AB,
This assumption would seem quite plausible on its face since all municipalities employed the AB for the senatorial contest-irrespective of whether or not they did so for the federal deputy contest.
Given that the ballot technologies for the two contests were effectively delinked, there is no compelling reason to believe that the presence or absence of the AB for the federal deputy contest would have systematically affected voting patterns for the senate. 4 The second assumption utilized is a weak form of the so-called parallel paths assumption. In 4 Note that the assumption above is weaker than the assumption that the ballot technology adopted for the federal deputy contest would not have affected voting patterns for the senatorial contest for any municipality, i.e.  particular, we assume that, conditional on the vector of attributes X  , the average over time difference in the difference in the outcome across institutional settings for the treated units would have been the same as the average over time difference in the difference in the outcome across institutional settings for the control units had the treated units not received the treatment:
This very weak assumption allows for arbitrary baseline differences between treatment and control units due to (time invariant) unobserved heterogeneity, the existence of distinct time trends for federal deputy and senate contests, and the possibility that sources of unobserved heterogeneity affect outcomes for federal deputy contests and senate contests in different ways.
Now let us define the generic regression function (| )
In the context considered here, we have
, so that the regression function equals the expected value of the over time difference in the difference in the outcome across federal deputy and senate contests in municipalities with ballot technology  and fixed attributes .
Denoting the conditional distribution of X  =  given   =  as  |= (), the assumptions above imply that the ATT is identified from the observables in the model as
which states that the ATT is equal to the average value of the over time difference in crossinstitutional differences in the outcome for the treated units minus the average value of the counterfactual regression function, where the average is taken over the marginal distribution of covariates among the treated units.
Estimation. Equation (2) suggests a fairly straightforward estimator of the ATT,
where b (0 ) is an estimator of the regression function (0 ). Intuitively, the regression estimator
That is to say, for all treated units, the regression estimator is used to compute the over time difference in the difference in outcomes across institutional areas that would have obtained had a given municipality (counterfactually) not received the AB. The ATT, in turn, is estimated as the difference between the average value of the observed over time difference in cross-institutional differences in the outcome for the treated units minus the average value of the estimated counterfactual over time difference in cross-institutional differences calculated for those same units. In order to calculate the ATT, we utilize several fairly standard strategies for estimating the quantity b (0 X  ), including nearest neighbor matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985) , local linear matching (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997), and coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King, and Porro 2011). In the interest of assessing the robustness of our findings, we also estimate the ATT using such methods as propensity score weighting (Hirano and Imbens 2001) and ordinary least squares regression.
Findings
Raw data. We begin by simply examining the institutional and temporal difference in outcomes without conditioning on the demographic features of municipalities. We further explore this hypothesis by examining the behavior of the ideological center of gravity, a measure which explicitly compares Right versus Left support in each type of election. Figure 3 presents a look at the raw data. The uppermost panels reveal that in 1958, when the AB was in place everywhere for the senate and nowhere for federal deputy, the ideological center of gravity leaned significantly further to the Right in federal deputy elections than senate elections, both in the interior municipalities of São Paulo as well as those of the control states. In 1962, the ideological center of gravity moves further to the Left in federal deputy contests than senate contests across the board, but this move is particularly pronounced within the municipalities located in the interior of São Paulo. Following the same procedure described above, the naïve ATT estimate for the effect of the AB on the ideological center of gravity was found to be equal to -0. 22 We next turn our attention to the impact of the AB on our proxy for broker control, the vote concentration index. It is important to recognize that this variable is constructed based upon the valid votes cast for all candidates within a given municipality. As a consequence, it can be thought of as a measure of broker influence over the vote choices of individuals who cast their votes correctly, i.e. individuals who were able to cast votes that pasted muster with electoral authorities and thus counted towards the final totals that determined the election of candidates. What these results seem to indicate is that there was no radical reduction in the capacity of Brazil's coronéis to control the (valid) vote as a consequence of the introduction of the AB. Municipalities which conducted federal deputy elections using the AB did not experience a significantly larger shift towards more competitive elections at the local level than did municipalities which conducted said elections using the old candidate printed ballots. This has important implications for the mechanism by which the AB may have shifted the ideological balance of power in the party system.
In particular, it casts doubt on the claim that the AB shifted the party system to the Left because effective vote secrecy liberated the clients of local notables to vote as they wish. If this were indeed true for the elections studied here, then the adoption of the AB should have brought about a marked reduction in the concentration of the vote, as formerly captive electorates became free to vote for the candidates that they, and not the local boss, most highly favored. As it stands, the measured effect is small in magnitude and only marginally statistically significant. The lack of evidence for the aforementioned mechanism naturally raises questions. If the AB did not shift the party system to the Left because it caused local notables to lose their persuasive capacity vis-a-vis clients, then how do we explain the substantial move to the Left that the AB appears to have engendered in Brazil?
Addressing this question brings us to the most provocative findings of the paper. Figure 5 depicts the manner in which the percentage of wasted votes evolved as a function of the introduction of the AB. In the municipalities within São Paulo, one observes a remarkable shift. In 1958, when the AB was in place for senate elections but not federal deputy elections, on average the percentage of wasted votes in senate contests was substantially greater than that encountered for federal deputy contests (24% vs. 11%). In 1962, when the AB was in place for both types of contests, on average the percentage of wasted votes in the two types of contests was nearly identical (33% vs. 34%). In the control state municipalities, on the other hand, one finds a different pattern. In 1958, as in the case of São Paulo, on average the percentage of wasted votes in senate contests was substantially greater than that encountered for federal deputy contests (16% vs. 8%). In 1962, with the institutional rules in these municipalities staying fixed, one continues to observe a substantially greater percentage of wasted votes for senate contests than for federal deputy contests (29% vs. 12%). received 17% of total votes cast in the federal deputy election. 5 In other words, the AB increased the percentage of wasted votes cast by an amount greater than the total percentage of votes being tallied by the country's major party organizations! These results suggest that the AB almost certainly had a major disenfranchising effect on the Brazilian electorate. In order to assess the relevance of this consequence of the AB for the leftward shift in the direction of the party system, we need to identify the voters who were most strongly affected by ballot reform and provide a sense of the historic voting patterns of these individuals.
Subsequent sections of the paper take up this task. Before addressing this issue, however, we reassess the impact of the AB on our outcomes by properly conditioning on socio-economic and demographic features of municipalities that may systematically differ across our treatment and control groups.
Estimates with covariate conditioning. The state of São Paulo is different from other states in Brazil in a number of important ways. It is the country's most populous state and it has the largest economy of any Brazilian state by far. Moreover, São Paulo is among the country's most educated states, with an extensive university system, a large industrial base, and a well developed service sector. Of course, São Paulo, like all Brazilian states, is highly diverse: it contains municipalities with extremely high levels of wealth and human capital and municipalities with substantially lower levels of the same.
In order to make certain that our estimates of the causal effect of the AB are not being driven by differences in the baseline characteristics of municipalities in São Paulo and the control states, this section of the paper presents ATT estimates based upon explicitly conditioning on such characteristics. Since the paper's triple differencing strategy should alleviate most concerns about confounding, we were fairly selective in our use of covariates. Specifically, we chose to condition on four key demographic and socioeconomic indicators (all variables were measured in 1960): 1) the population size of the municipality; 2) the literacy rate in the municipality; 3) the proportion of permanent homes with a radio (a proxy for access to political information); and 4) the proportion of the working age population employed in industry. Table 1 depicts the means of these indicators across our treatment and control groups. There are indeed some stark differences across the groups. For instance, the average literacy rate for the São Paulo municipalities is substantially higher than that for the control municipalities (60% vs. 42%),
as is the average percentage of homes with a radio (40% vs. 18%). Fortunately, the table also shows that the conditioning strategies adopted by the paper were able to produce matched control groups which approximated fairly closely the characteristics of the treatment municipalities. By selectively weighting municipalities within the treatment group, these algorithms help ensure that the paper's estimates of causal effect are based upon a comparison of units which are reasonably similar. Notes: Nearest neighbor matching was conducted with on an estimated propensity score and was with replacement. Local linear matching, also using an estimated propensity score, employed a bandwidth parameter equal to .8. The coarsened exact matching procedure exactly matched treatment and control units based upon the deciles of the literacy rate as well as the 5th, 10th, 25th, 40th, 60th, 75th, 90th, and 95th percentiles of the other covariates. Treatment and control units without exact matches were discarded from the analysis. Left. These effects were estimated to be statistically significant and substantively large, irrespective of the particular covariate conditioning technique that was utilized. On the contrary, there was little evidence that the introduction of the AB had an impact on the concentration of the vote. Although the negative sign of the estimated ATT was consistent with theoretical expectations throughout, in no case could the null hypothesis that the estimated impact of the AB on vote concentration was zero be definitively rejected. Finally, the findings on wasted votes remained exceptionally stark.
The introduction of the AB clearly engendered a massive increase in the percentage of wasted votes cast, with point estimates of the effect ranging from 18% to 22% across estimators. As before, these estimated effects had extremely narrow confidence intervals. In sum, the AB disenfranchised a sizeable segment of the electorate and shifted valid voting patterns to the Left, but it did not appear to have any immediate effect on the persuasive power of local brokers. In order to evaluate if the AB had differential effects on effective political participation by literacy, we divided the sample into three subsamples whose boundaries roughly correspond to the terciles of the literacy rate. Within each subsample, we then calculated the ATT for the impact of the AB on wasted votes by using raw averages and by conditioning on covariates using linear regression.
Naturally, one would expect that the magnitude of the impact of the AB on wasted votes would be larger in municipalities where levels of literacy were low than in municipalities where they were high. Figure 7 presents the findings.
We find evidence of an extremely strong differential effect of the AB. In municipalities where the literacy rate was the lowest (less than 45% literate), the estimated impact of the AB on wasted votes was approximately twice as large as the estimated impact of the AB in municipalities where the literacy rate was the highest (greater than 65% literate). Moreover, as expected, the estimated effect of the AB in the middle subsample was in between those of the two subsamples in the extremes. The absolute magnitude of the impact of the AB on wasted votes within the least literate subsample was truly striking: in these municipalities, approximately a third of the otherwise correctly voting public cast a wasted vote due to the introduction of the AB. Given these big differences in the effect of the AB on wasted votes across groups of municipalities defined by the literacy rate, the disenfranchising effect of the AB could certainly in theory explain the leftward shift in valid voting patterns, so long as there was also strong evidence that illiterate voters had a tendency to cast their lot with the parties of the Right. Let us consider what the data have to say in this regard. Table 2 presents the results of a series of linear regressions which regress the ideological center of gravity for federal deputy contests held using candidate printed ballots onto the literacy rate and the other demographic variables utilized in our analysis. Such regressions can help reveal whether or not illiterate voters had a strong tendency to vote with parties of the Right prior to the adoption of the AB. As it turns out, our findings are unequivocal in this respect. Higher levels of literacy were strongly negatively and statistically significantly associated with the ideological center of gravity, meaning that municipalities with relatively many literate voters tended to vote for the Left whereas municipalities with relatively many illiterate voters tended to vote for the Right. In fact, in the 1958 election the literacy rate alone explained 27% of the variance in the ideological center of gravity. The findings for the 1962 election, for which we exclude the state of São Paulo due to its adoption of the AB in that year, are similar in the tight linkage they reveal between the literacy rate and ideological voting patterns. proportions and a non-parametric model which utilizes a mixture of bivariate Normal densities (with the number of clusters optimally selected given the data) for the same. Figure 9 presents barplots of our estimates from both of these ecological inference models. Taken together, the municipal-level regressions and ecological inference estimates tell a simple but important story: under the old candidate printed ballot system, illiterate voters overwhelmingly cast their lot with the parties of the Right. The potential ramifications for the ideological balance of power in the party system of any ballot reform that effectively disenfranchised illiterates were quite large indeed. Quantities of interest were calculated using the ecological inference models presented in Imai, Lu, and Strauss (2008), which are implemented in the R software package eco (Imai, Lu, and Strauss 2011). In total, 25,000 draws from the posterior density were calculated, with a burn-in period of 10,000 draws. Of the remaining draws, every sixth draw was retained.
These results help us close the circle in terms of explaining why the AB caused such a considerable shift in fortunes in favor of the Left. Ballot reform created a considerable obstacle to voting correctly, one which was frankly insuperable for a large segment of voters with minimal literacy skills. By in large, these minimally literate voters were clients of Brazil's rural bosses, who, as large landowners and employers, directed their dependents to vote for candidates belonging to the parties of the ideological Right. After reform, the clients of the rural bosses who were able to vote did not appear to radically break from the dictates of the bosses-municipal vote concentration remained steady.
However, because so many of the traditional clients of the rural bosses, and ipso facto, Right parties, could no longer vote correctly, the relative importance of this segment of the electorate had declined considerably. Statewide elections thus came to be won or lost more and more in the urban centers and less in the countryside. In this way, the Right began to lose support not because the local bosses lost their persuasive power, but rather because they lost their electorates. With all said and done, the AB did appear to weaken the electoral relevance of clientelism in Brazil, but it did so in a curious and somewhat insidious fashion: by effectively taking the ballot out of the hands of the clients.
Conclusion
With a few important exceptions, discussions of the impact of the AB have concentrated almost entirely on the downstream implications of the degree of effective vote secrecy it provides but have largely ignored the manner in which it may affect the accessibility of the vote. This study's examination of Brazil's historical experience with the AB suggests that taking accessibility issues for granted is a mistake: the introduction of the AB created a massive increase in the proportion of wasted votes, one that was especially acute in zones of high illiteracy that had traditionally served as the bastions of Right politicians. Changes in vote accessibility thus had an important impact on the ideological balance of power in the party system. The larger lesson here is that, depending upon the social, institutional, and educational context in which ballot reform is to be implemented, there may be an important trade-off between ballot secrecy and accessibility.
Ultimately, the intensity of this trade-off depends on two key features of a polity: its underlying level of literacy and its electoral institutions. A polity's level of literacy is clearly important because this will determine the capacity of citizens to engage with and understand a standardized ballot.
Polities which make the transition to the AB after their citizens have attained a high level of literacy are unlikely to experience the significant disenfranchisement effects this paper has uncovered in the case of Brazil and that earlier studies identified in the US South. On the other hand, it is not necessarily the case that countries with relatively low levels of literacy will experience equally large disenfranchisement effects if and when they adopt the AB. The magnitude of any such effects will be determined to a large extent by a country's system of electoral rules, in particular: 1) whether or not the rules governing legislative elections allow citizens to vote for candidates instead of parties; and, if voting for candidates is permitted; 2) the degree to which electoral rules limit the set of candidates to a reasonably small number.
For countries with significant pockets of illiteracy, the use of the AB presents the lowest risk of 
